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AIR TRANSPORT RULES OF ARBITRATION
By Howard C. Westwood
Virtually all the scheduled air carriers have recently set up a
machinery for arbitration of disputes arising out of agreements
between them. The machinery itself is of interest to the student of
extra-State institutions of government, and its adoption may mark a
significant point in the gradual evolution of the industry.
The machinery is incorporated in the Air Transport Rules of
Arbitration, to be administered by the American Arbitration Associa-
tion whose record in commercial arbitration has won nation-wide
confidence.
SCOPE OF THE PROCEDURE
The carriers have provided that when any agreement between
any of them specifies that it shall be subject to the Rules of Arbitra-
tion, any controversy or claim of any nature arising out of that
agreement shall be settled in accordance with those Rules, and judg-
ment rendered in the arbitration may be entered in court. While the
provision is quite like the ordinary submission to arbitration, two
features should be noted.
In the first place the arbitration machinery is to be available for
the settlement of disputes concerning any kind of agreements. The
agreements may range from leases or sales of equipment to agree-
ments providing for self-regulation of trade practices and operating
methods.
In the second place the arbitration procedure provided for in
these rules, as is true generally of arbitration procedure administered
by the American Arbitration Association, is to be voluntary in char-
acter based upon a voluntary contractual relationship; arbitration is
not to be imposed upon any carrier unless it voluntarily agrees thereto.
It is only when an inter-carrier agreement specifically provides
therefor that it will be subject to ,the arbitration procedure. Thus
the carriers have, in this particular measure, rejected the always
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tempting course of bending a minority to the majority's will.
NATURE OF ARBITRATION TRIBUNALS
The Rules themselves do not provide for a sole arbiter, or a
permanent tribunal of any nature. Rather they establish a panel to
consist of a standing list of persons approved by the directors of the
American Arbitration Association and of the Air Transport Associa-
tion, of which all the participating carriers are members. Then,
whenever a case arises, three persons are to be selected from that
panel, in a manner described below, to act as arbitrators in that par-
ticular case. While the panel has not yet been announced it would
appear likely that it will include persons widely distributed over the
country.
In providing for a pane*l, with a special tribunal to be selected in
each case, there are both risks and advantages. Since no single
person or single group will decide all cases, there is risk of diverging
interpretations upon occasion and of lack of continuity. These risks
are substantial. Against their development there are three safe-
guards. In the first place the administration of the Rules by the
American Arbitration Association's staff will enable the arbitrators
in a particular case to be informed respecting problems of procedure
which may have arisen theretofore, and the Rules themselves state
that any differences concerning the application or meaning of the
procedure provided for in the Rules shall be settled by the Arbitra-
tion Committee of the Arbitration Association. In this and in other
respects the Arbitration Association can introduce a cohesive influ-
ence among the transitory and loose-knit tribunals. In the second
place, as experience dictates, the panel can be kept relatively small
in number or certain particular members of the panel can be drawn
upon repeatedly in cases where continuity of decision and procedure
is of special importance. And in the third place the carriers have
.provided that in the case of their traffic agreements, reached by way
of Air Traffic Conference resolution, decisions of arbitrators in one
case shall constitute an interpretation of the agreement binding upon
all members of the Conference whether or not they were parties to
the case and with respect to their conduct both before and after the
decision was rendered, just as though the interpretation had been
incorporated in the original agreement.' This is a somewhat daring
1. In the Conference, a division of the Air Transport Association, the
carriers are represented by their traffic and sales executives under by-laws which
permit agreements to be entered into by simple resolution. The Conference andits procedures are an interesting and signiflcant institution which, if successful,
may very well prove a model for similar institutionalization of other facets
of industry activity. Wherever industry-wide action of a consensual nature indesirable, the advantages of providing a forum for convenient and prompt action
are obvious.
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effort, by agreement, to incorporate the principle of stare decisis
into the functioning of private tribunals.
If, in the face of these safeguards, the risk of lack of continuity
still appears substantial, one can only recognize that the carriers'
choice provides for a convenient, economical and elastic system which
has its own virtues. A sole arbiter, or even a permanent tribunal or
set of tribunals, could hardly be provided as conveniently or as
economically. 2And if arbitration is to occur in a wide variety of
situations, involving sometimes rather fine legal points, sometimes
peculiar knowledge of business practices, and sometimes. complex
technological issues, resort to fixed tribunals might be most imprac-
tical. Moreover, the system chosen by the carriers guards against the
charge of prejudice which might someday eventuate were a sole
arbiter or permanent tribunal or tribunals to have been set up.
The choice is certainly not an easy one. Arbitration, it is con-
templated, will be used to enforce, among other things, trade prac-
tices established by agreement. Continuity and consistency of deci-
sions respecting such practices is very important. Yet suspicion of
favor for one or another conflicting interest is more likely to arise
in the enforcement of a trade practice governing competitive methods
than in any other type of case. At this stage of the industry's develop-
ment the carriers certainly cannot be deemed to have been unreason-
able in having adopted a machinery which, even at the possible im-
pairment of continuity and consistency of decisions, is most free of
engendering charges of favor on the part of the deciding tribunals.
In this connection, the method of choosing the tribunal, from
the panel, to sit in a particular case is, of course, of significance.
CHOICE OF ARBITRATORS
.The Rules provide for two types of proceeding. One is a pro-
ceeding instituted upon a complaint by a carrier that another has
violated an agreement. The other is a proceeding instituted upon a
request by a carrier for an opinion as to the meaning of an agreement.
The former would ordinarily seek not only an interpretation of an
agreement but also damages or other relief. The latter would seek
only an interpretation, and could be instituted quite independently
of any immediate controversy.
The former type of proceeding will ordinarily involve only
a limited number of parties-frequently, no doubt, only two. "Upon
such a proceeding the Arbitration Association will submit to the
2. Under the carriers' Rules the arbitrators receive no compensation unless
with the consent of the Arbitration Association. This is a common provision In
connection with arbitration administered by the Arbitration Association.
3. See n. 4, 4nlra.
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parties a list of names selected from the panel. Each party will then
indicate to the Arbitration Association which of such persons it
would object to. The Association will then select the three arbitra-
tors from those persons not objected to. Only if this proves impos-
sible will the Association be free to select arbitrators in some other
manner (but still only from the panel) which "appears to it to be
fair". In general, this is the usual method followed by the Arbitra-
tion Association for selection of arbitrators in connection with its
regular commercial arbitration procedure., and has been found to be
eminently satisfactory.
In the case of a proceeding upon a request for an opinion,
however, there will, typically it would seem, be many more parties.
Under the Rules any party to an agreement involved in such a
request may become a party to the proceeding by filing notice of its
intention to do so. It would seem likely that, since in such a pro-
ceeding involvement in costs would be very slight, since there is
no question of award of damages, and since the issue will be purely
abstract (at least in theory), most if not all the parties to the agree-
ment brought into question will become parties to the proceeding.
In view of the fact that the decision will affect them all-indeed in
the case of an Air Traffic Conference agreement it is to be formally
binding upon them all-there is a special incentive to become parties.
Thus in these cases there may be ten or twenty parties, and the
submission ahead of time of lists of persons from the panel, with
objections to be noted by all parties, would be impractical and of
doubtful value. It is therefore provided that in such a case the
Arbitration Association may, with or without the prior submission
of lists of names, select the three arbitrators "in whatever manner
appears to it to be fair." Fortunately the unquestioned integrity and
enviable reputation of the Arbitration Association frees from' sus-
picion the granting of this broad power, and it may be expected
that the Association will in any case follow the practice of prior
submission of lists wherever practical or wherever of value.4
The Arbitration Association likewise has the power to disqualify
any arbitrator for cause.
4. In the case of a proceeding upon a complaint there is also the possibility
of multiplicity of parties, for the Rules give to any party to an agreement
involved in a complaint, whether or not it Is charged with a violation, the same
right to become a party to the proceeding which is conferred in the case of a
proceeding upon a request for an opinion. The reason is that an interpretation
rendered in a proceeding upon a complaint will have the same effect, upon all
parties to an agreement, as does an interpretation rendered in a proceeding
upon a request for an opinion. But it seems probable that the complaint-
procedure will not be so likely to precipitate widespread intervention, since on
toany occasions the gravamen of the proceeding will doubtless involve disputed.
issues of fact, rather than important questions of interpretation- of the agreement.
However the possibility of widespread intervention even in such a case cannot
be ignored.
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ROLE OF AIR TRANSPORT AssOcIATION
Next in importance to the provisions for the choice of arbitra-
tors is the place of the Air Transport Association, and therefore of
all the carriers as a group, in the arbitration procedure.
One of the generally accepted functions of any trade association
is that of facilitating the clearing up of misunderstandings among
its members. This is accomplished in a variety of ways-through
the dissemination of information, through the provision of a forum
for discussion and consultation, and even through active mediation
when disputes arise. But' when a trade association steps beyond
such functions of enlightenment or of conciliation or of mediation
-in other words, beyond the function of pure "talk"-and assumes
the function of defining rights and duties in inter-member relation-
ships it is treading on dangerous ground. Sometimes this can be
done successfully. Often it can be done, no doubt, with respect to
special categories of relationships.-" But generally a trade associa-
tion invites trouble when it steps astride an inter-member dispute
and assumes to find the right of the issue.
Consequently the air carriers have very wisely provided that the
Air Transport Association shall perform purely clerical functions
in the arbitration procedure. All papers are to be filed with the
Transport Association which in turn transmits them to the Arbitra-
tion Association and to all parties to the particular agreement
involved in the proceeding. The Transport Association likewise is
to see to it that all such parties receive notices of the dates of hearings
and copies of the arbitrators' decisions.
Thus the Transport Association has nothing to do with the
settlement of a dispute, save to act as filing clerk and clearing house.
But the manner in which this function is to be discharged is itself
of significance. For every party to an agreement involved in a
proceeding is to be kept fully informed of the nature and progress
of the proceeding at each of its stages. Not only does this protect
the interests of the various parties to an agreement, but it likewise
provides the basic information for the mobilization of the force of
industry opinion wherever that would be apposite.
The Rules likewise provide that when a complaint or request
for an opinion is filed with the Transport Association, its transmittal
to the Arbitration Association, which sets the machinery in motion,
may be delayed by the Transport Association with the consent of
5. For instance: In the case of air carriers rights and duties under certainjoint tariffs can logically and practically be defined through an association organ
ecause-of the need for uniformity of practice and the relative absence of extreme
conflict of interest. The air carriers have already evolved, to a modest degree.
one such instance of centralized definition of rights and duties.
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the person filing the paper. This gives to the Transport Association
the opportunity of invoking informal influiences of conciliation or
mediation if the parties are agreeable.
CONDUCT OF HEARINGS
After the filing of the complaint or request, and any answers or
amendments, and after the naming of the arbitrators and the fixing
of a date and place for the hearing, convenient to'the parties, the
conduct of the hearing itself is in the hands of the arbitrators. The
Rules contain certain provisions as to the order of proceeding and
certaih guarantees as to right of examination, cross-examination,
argument, keeping of a record, etc., but the hearing is very informal
and subject to large discretion upon the part of the arbitrators.
The hearing is held in private, as is customary in the case of the
Arbitration Association's procedure, unless the parties otherwise
agree. The parties may waive an oral hearing and submit the
matter in writing. The clerical work in connection with a hearing
is handled by a clerk appointed by the Arbitration Association. In
.these provisions there is nothing unusual.
DECISION OF ARBITRATORS
The arbitrators are to act by majority vote. Their decision is to
be rendered within thirty days after the close of the proceedings
unless the parties agree to a longer time. The decision must be made
in writing, and executed and delivered in accordance to the prevailing
arbitration law. In a proceeding upon a complaint the arbitrators
may either require the payment of money," or may require one or
more parties to do certain acts or to refrain from or cease doing
certain acts. The arbitrators may also provide for the payment of
money in case the parties refuse to abide by a requirement that
certain acts be done, refrained from, or ceased. Moreover in any
case where payments of money are required the arbitrators are not
confined to providing only for compensatory damages. In specify-
ing the payments to be made the arbitrators may take into account
the disruptive effect of proved violations of duty upon traffic and
upon the relations between the carriers, the wilful nature of the
breach of duty, the likelihood of recurrence of the breach either upon
the part of the person found at fault or upon the part of others,
any facts in mitigation of the breach of duty, "and any similar
considerations". Sums so determined may be required to be divided
6. Both in the proceeding upon complaint and in that upon a request for
an :opinion there is provision for the assessment of costs.
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among all or any of the parties to the agreement in question as the
arbitrators deem appropriate.
Thus the carriers have endeavored to empower the arbitrators
not only to interpret agreements, but also to award compensatory
damages, to enforce specific performance, and to assess what would
amount to fines dictated by punitive and preventive considerations.
Power so broad: is not usual in commercial arbitration. But where,
as here, arbitration is contemplated as a means of enforcing self-
imposed rules of conduct any power less extensive would seem almost
to be futile.
The broad power thus conferred can, however, be limited by
the parties. The Rules contain another provision, applicable to all
the powers to be exercised by the arbitrators, which states that the
powers granted the arbitrators may be either expanded or limited
by any agreement to which the parties to the proceeding are parties.
Thus, in an agreement for the lease of equipment, for instance,
the parties might provide that the arbitrators should have no power
to make any award save for compensatory damages. Or, in the
case of an Air Traffic Conference resolution, certain maximum
limitations on the amount of any punitive damages might be imposed,
scaled, perhaps, according to the number of times an offense is com-
mitted. In brief, the carriers have provided an extraordinary adjust-
able scheme, which can be suited to any case.
ENFORCEAIILITY OF DECISIONS
The Rules themselves provide no particular procedure for the
enforcement or interpretation of a decision of arbitrators, although
the members of the Air Traffic Conference have provided for the
posting of a bond to secure adherence to decisions upon Conference
resolutions.
The Rules might very well have included a special provision
at least for determining whether a decision of arbitrators had been
complied with, particularly in view of the fact that in some cases the
arbitrators might decree specific performance. It may be that the
failure to include such a provision will prove a defect. Of course
a fresh proceeding under the Rules is always available. In any case
the defect, if it proves to be such, can readily be corrected.
As to the broad question of the legal enforceability of a decision
of arbitrators, an entire treatise could be written. State and federal
statutes upon the subject vary. There has also been a history of
antipathy on the part of the common law toward efforts to set up
an extra-State judicial process. Further complicating the problem
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in this instance is the frank provision in the Rules that payments
of money may be required whether or not measurable damages have
been proved-thus the courts' antagonism to the enforcement of
penalties is risked.7
Suffice it here to suggest that if the question of legal enforce-
ability of the arbitrators' decisions is significant, the effort to provide
a comprehensive system of arbitration is probably doomed to failure.
For even if the decisions of arbitrators were legally enforceable in
every jurisdiction without question," were it to prove necessary to
go to court in order to secure compliance, the values of arbitration
would be most seriously curtailed. In the last analysis, this system
can work only if it has the support of industry opinion. And if it
has that support it may be doubted whether the utter absence of legal
enforceability of the arbitrators' decisions would make any difference
whatever.
ATTITUDE OF CIVIL AERONAUTIcS AUTHORITY
Of almost as great importance to the vitality of the arbitration
procedure as the attitude of the carriers is the attitude of the Civil
Aeronautics Authority.
While the Rules themselves apparently need not be submitted
to the Authority for approval,' certain other agreements, to be
subject to the Rules, will have to be filed with the Authority for its
approval or disapproval. When that occurs it is possible that the
Authority, in some cases, may find it necessary to take into account,
in deciding whether to approve a specific agreement, the arbitration
procedure which is to apply under that agreement. 10
The recent growth of commercial arbitration, and the excellent
record established by the American Arbitration Association in its
work, will very likely command the confidence of the Authority. In
7. An Interesting provision of the Civil Aeronautics Act states that air
carriers shall file with the Authority certain types of agreements "whether
enforceable by provisions for liquidated damages, penalties, bonds or otherwise"
and when any such agreement is approved by the Authority the parties are free
of the anti-trust laws "and of all other restraints or prohibitions made by. or
imposed under, authority of law," insofar as necessary to enable them to do
anything so approved. Sec. 412, 414.
8. Of course the parties to a particular proceeding can sign a formal
submission to arbitration as provided for in the various applicable state statutes
and it Is very doubtful that there would be any serious question respecting the
enforceability of an arbitrators' award based upon such a submission.
9. Sec. 412 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, as already mentioned, see supra
n. 7, requires certain agreements between the carriers to be filed with the
Authority. These are, in general, agreements for regulating competition and
other cooperative arrangements. The carriers' agreement providing for the
arbitration procedure merely sets up a machinery and in itself fixes no rights
or duties. The machinery is created, to be availed of when desired. In this
respect the agreement is not unlike the by-laws of the Air Traffic Conference,
which also simply set up a machinery. When these by-laws were filed the
Authority took the view that they did not come within the scope of see. 412
since they amounted merely to a means to facilitate entering into agreements,
and did not, in themselves, fix rights or duties.
10. The effect of Authority disapproval is not in 'itself to invalidate an
agreement. Disapproval results only in a denial of exemption from the anti-
trust laws and any other legal restraints which may be applicable. See supra n. 7.
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any event it is difficult to see what possible reason the Authority-
could have for antagonism toward arbitration unless it were some-
how to be subverted as an instrument of oppression against weaker
carriers. Any such possibility is purely academic, and under the
present Rules such a result could hardly occur even were there the
desire to bring it about.
There is one question, however, which is conceivable. If the
carriers were to reach an agreement to do (or to refrain from doing)
some thing which is commanded (or prohibited) by the Act or by
a regulation thereunder, and were to provide that the agreement
would be subject to the Rules of Arbitration, would the Authority
hesitate to approve the agreement because of some fear that the
carriers would thereby be superseding the law enforcement provisions
of the Civil Aeronautics Act?
In considering this question one is immediately reminded of the
common law's antipathy to arbitration, which we mentioned a
moment ago. This attitude is difficult to justify. While it may be
uncharitable to say so, the attitude seems attributable to jealousy
rather than to any cogent considerations of policy.
However the question with which the Authority might be faced
is quite different from that with which the courts have dealt when
they have entertained suits on contracts despite a failure to resort
to arbitration provisions in the contracts and when they have refused
to enforce arbitration awards. In the latter type of case the contract
itself was the sole definition of rights and duties. In the case we are
supposing there would be two definitions of rights and duties. One
would be contained in the Act or what, for the sake of argunlent,
amounts to the same thing, a regulation. The other definition would
appear in the inter-carrier agreement. A particular item of conduct
in violation of one definition of duty would, in the case we are sup-
posing, also violate the other definition of duty. But the two defini-
tions would be quite distinct and quite independent of each other.
And it would seem that, despite its commitment to resort to arbitra-
tion as a means of settling disputes arising under the agreement, a
carrier would be free to institute a complaint with the Authority on
account of alleged violation of the statutory duty without prior resort
to the arbitration procedure. And most assuredly the Authority
would be free to institute proceedings questioning compliance with
the statutory mandate quite without regard to the fact that a con-
tractual mandate were also involved.
To illustrate: The Act prescribes that rates shall be reasonable.
Suppose the carriers went so far as to enter into an agreement, to be
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* subject to the Rules of Arbitration, providing that rates shall be
reasonable, and suppose the agreement were approved by the Author-
ity. Suppose, then, that one carrier contends that another has charged
unreasonable rates. If the contention is correct two duties have
been violated. One, the statutory duty, is a duty owed to the public,
enforceable by the Authority in proceedings instituted on its own
initiative or on complaint. The other is a contractual duty which
is enforceable by the civil courts, with whatever force those courts
may give to the provision for arbitration. The former duty, it would
appear, is enforceable by the Authority upon its own initiative or
upon complaint by anyone interested (including the carrier who
contends that the rate is unreasonable) entirely aside from the ques-
tion whether the contractual duty has been violated or whether the
corrective processes prescribed in the contract have been resorted
to. And the carriers' agreement that alleged violations of the con-
tractual duty shall be subject to arbitration would not seem suscept-
ible of an interpretation that they should refrain from seeking
enforcement, by the statutory processes, of the statutory duty.
If this be the case, and we suggest it as the reasonable view of
the matter, the Authority has nothing to be concerned about.. There
would be no effort to tie its hands or to supersede its jurisdiction or
to "boycott" the processes of the Act. Only a profound jealousy
of the functioning of private agencies of correction, exceeding even
the jealousy displayed by the common law toward arbitration, could,
in these circumstances, explain a disapproval by the Authority of an
agreement on the ground that it is subject to arbitration. While
such a jealousy might be harbored in the breasts of administrators
intent upon elaborating their own powers, the Authority has given
ample evidence that it has no such inclinations.
Since the foregoing analysis argues that statutory and con-
tractual duties are quite independent, and that an agreement as to
the method of redress on account of an alleged violation of the
latter cannot affect the processes of redress on account of an
alleged violation of the former, it might be asked whether there
would ever be any purpose to be served by carriers' entering into
an agreement of the type indicated. Arbitration-under the fore-
going analysis-could be ignored by running to the Authority. Why,
then, have arbitration in such a case?
There are at least two very good reasons.
The most obvious is that an agreemeni on the subject would
give a right to damages which could be readily determined by the
convenient processes of private arbitration, which the Authority,
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under the Act, has no power to award, and the right to which, were
there to be reliance solely upon the Act, might be either entirely
absent or so illusory as to be fruitless.
There is another reason which does concern the Authority, as
a practical matter, and which should command its sympathy. There
are various qualities of violations of statutory duties. Some seriously
concern the public. Some-depending upon the facts-may be of
no great immediate concern to the public. The Authority can, prac-
tically speaking, exercise some choice respecting those violations
which it pursues promptly and vigorously. Were it forever to pursue
with equal promptness and vigor every violation, without regard to
relative importance to the public, it might one day find itself with
a huge burden upon its hands. No administrative agency does, or
can, act so blindly. It must exercise some discretion and budget its
efforts. If upon certain matters the carriers have created contrac-
tual duties paralleling statutory duties, and if their contractual pro-
cesses of enforcement are working reasonably well, the Authority
could take that fact into account in budgeting its efforts. In short,
while the Authority would at all times retain a free hand to enforce,
or to entertain complaints concerning, the statutory duty, the pres-
ence of the contractual duty and of contractual processes of enforce-
ment might well lead the Authority in appropriate cases to await the
outcome of the contractual processes (and even to encourage resort
thereto) before it decided whether the public interest required action
upon its part. Thereby the Authority might find a help to ease its
own administrative burdens and to conserve its resources. And-
at the game time-the carriers might, through resort to their own
organs, save themselves expense and inconvenience."'
In this thought there is nothing startling or unprecedented.
Whatever in it is new results only from the suggestion that there be
a regularly established institution, through the medium of the Rules
of Arbitration, for adjusting disputes and relationships. That point
11. We have presented an analysis of an agreement to comply with a
statutory duty which supposes that the statutory duty is owed to the public
quite aside from the agreement. It is, however, possible that some statutory
duties might be of an entirely private nature and that the Authority's role as
the enforcing agency might be altogether similar to the role of a court in
entertaining a suit upon a private contract. Of such a quality might be a statu-
tory provision to the effect-for instance-that one carrier shall not entice away
the services of another carrier's employees without paying damages therefor
to be determined by the Authority. Were any such provision to appear in the
Act, and were the carriers to agree not to entice away each other's employees,
the agreement to be subject to the Rules of Arbitration, the Authority would be
faced with a question quite different from the question discussed above concern-
Ing the agreement to charge reasonable rates, and might properly take the view
-inconsistent with the traditional attitudes of the common law courts toward
arbitration-that the contract and the remedial processes provided therein
must, as a matter of law, first be exhausted before looking to any statutory
remedies. There may be some duties, even under the present Civil Aeronautics
Act, which would be of the quality suggested in this footnote. This speculation
is, however, tangential to the more important question discussed in the text.
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aside, there probably never has been and never will be an administra-
tive agency which does not encourage, upon occasion, intra-industry
and extra-State adjustments of difficulties which fall formally quite
within the statutory competence of the administrative body. Even
courts of law, while often feeling compelled, in the absence of statute,
officially to frown onl arbitration, have been known to take an active
role in encouraging disputants to resolve their differences without
judicial intervention.
In sum, then, there would seem to be reason for the Authority
even to welcome the creation of an arbitration procedure, despite
the fact that in some cases it might parallel some of the Authority's
own jurisdiction. And if arbitration works well, it is not incon-
ceivable that its importance as an instrument for industry regulation
will grow in a manner comparable to the growth in the importance
of commercial arbitration in the ordinary business world.
